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A PROPOSAL FOR REGULATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
THOMAS COMBS†
I. INTRODUCTION
Excessive
subprime
residential
mortgage
lending
has plunged the United States into one of the worst recessions
in a century. Although the underlying causes were many,
securitization played a large role as demand for securities backed
by subprime loans enabled subprime lending markets to flourish.
This Note argues that regulation of the Government-Sponsored
Enterprises1 (“GSEs”)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—is still
insufficient to prevent another crisis. It proposes changes to the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 20082 (“HERA”) intended
to ensure the GSEs’ future safety.
The GSEs were the single largest enablers of the subprime
crisis. They purchased and issued vast quantities of residential
mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) backed by subprime loans,
while enabling the deterioration of underwriting standards.
They strove to fulfill two contradictory goals: fulfilling the
affordable housing goals set by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”), while simultaneously producing a
healthy return for shareholders. They benefited from a widely
held belief that the GSEs’ securities are guaranteed by the
federal government. This unique situation—privatization of
profits and socialization of risk—created a moral hazard that led
GSE executives to take excessive risks.
†
St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John’s University School of
Law; M.M., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004; B.M., Stetson University, 2001.
1
The term “government-sponsored enterprise” means a corporate entity created
by a law of the United States that has a federal charter, is privately owned, is under
the direction of a board of directors, a majority of which is elected by private owners,
and is a financial institution with the power to make loans or loan guarantees for
limited purposes and to raise funds by borrowing. See 2 U.S.C. § 622(8) (2006). It
does not exercise powers reserved to the government, may not commit the
government financially, and is able to pay its own expenses. Id.
2
Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2850 (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.)
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The legislative and executive branches were unable to stop
the GSEs. Using affordable housing as a potent political weapon,
the GSEs successfully lobbied to protect their unique
congressional charters from effective regulatory oversight.
Eventually, however, as the crisis unfolded and loans entered
into default, the GSEs sought protection from the federal
government and are now under the conservatorship of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”).
Recognizing the GSEs’ role in the crisis, Congress passed
HERA, which altered the GSEs’ regulatory regime in significant
ways. HERA created the FHFA. FHFA is a strong, independent
regulatory agency with broad powers to set the GSEs’ capital
levels, approve new loan programs, and restrict lobbying activity.
HERA also imposed a broad affordable housing mandate on the
GSEs, requiring them to support affordable loan programs, and
gave FHFA complete discretion over the program’s scope.
HERA, however, has several defects. Aside from a general
requirement that the GSEs operate safely, the Act does not
sufficiently constrict the FHFA’s discretion in setting affordable
housing goals. Moreover, the Act does nothing to curtail the
GSEs’ enormous lobbying power.
This Note proposes various amendments to HERA designed
to prevent a repeat of the subprime crisis. First, HERA should
be amended to prevent the GSEs from lobbying the executive or
legislative branches of government. This will likely have the
effect of increasing government control over the GSEs. And
because the FHFA has already suspended the GSEs’ lobbying
activity, this is not a new suggestion, but one that has already
resulted in substantial positive effects.
Second, the Act should require the GSEs to focus on the core
mortgage market, making affordable housing just a small part of
their overall business. The GSEs should be prohibited from
purchasing private label RMBS, undoubtedly the most toxic
assets.
The federal government should offer an explicit
guarantee on mortgages backed by prime loans. Finally, there
should be a definite cap on the number of affordable housing
loans the GSEs can purchase. These changes will likely have the
effect of stabilizing the secondary mortgage market, and of
neutralizing the GSEs’ moral hazard by restricting their ability
to abuse affordable housing programs for political and financial
gain.
Any consequential reduction in the availability of
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affordable loans can be addressed through other federal
programs.
II. PROBLEMS AND NEED FOR CHANGE
This Part discusses how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
among the primary causes of the subprime crisis. After a brief
background discussion describing the key players in the
mortgage markets and data about the subprime crisis, the
Section explores the nexus between the RMBS market and
subprime loans and argues that investor demand for RMBS
provoked much subprime lending. The Part shows how the GSEs
stimulated the secondary market by abandoning conservative
underwriting standards and investing in subprime securities. In
the fallout of their 2003 and 2004 accounting scandals, the GSEs
acted with the intent to protect their unique congressional
charters. By using their dominant market position to shape the
subprime market with their affordable housing programs, they
fostered the illusion of prosperity in many congressional districts
by increasing the rate of homeownership, but did so in exchange
for support from congressmen and women and the President.
A.

Background

1.

The Key Players

To place this discussion in its proper context, some general
background information about how the GSEs impact the
residential mortgage market is necessary.
For the better part of a century, the residential mortgage
market has been shaped and standardized by federal sponsorship
of mortgages.3
Beginning with Depression-era legislation,
Congress created entities that gave the federal government
enormous influence over the residential mortgage market and
greatly increased its complexity: the GSEs, known as Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.4

3
See, e.g., Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006)) (providing money for slum-clearance projects and
construction of public housing, increasing the role of mortgage insurance, and
providing assistance to rural homeowners).
4
See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2185, 2195–97 (2007).
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In 1938, Congress created the Federal National Mortgage
Association (“Fannie Mae”).5 Fannie Mae’s function was to
purchase the Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA’s”)
“nonconventional” insured loans and provide a quick source of
capital to mortgage lenders.6 This new secondary market gave
many mortgage loan companies, insurance companies, and even
commercial banks the confidence they needed to get back into the
consumer home loan business after the Depression.7
In 1968, Congress privatized Fannie Mae and in 1970,
created its counterpart, Freddie Mac, and gave them each a new
mission: purchasing private non-government insured loans.8
Congress’s goal was to “provide liquidity, stability and
affordability to the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.”9
Relying on the “three Cs” of traditional underwriting—collateral,
capacity, and credit reputation—both Fannie and Freddie
purchased “conforming” loans meeting fairly stringent
underwriting criteria.10 Although many of these criteria were
later abandoned, for many years the GSEs set the gold standard
of mortgage underwriting.11
Originally, Fannie and Freddie simply held mortgages
themselves,12 but the nature of their business changed
dramatically with the advent of securitization.13 In the early
1970s, the GSEs began creating or insuring mortgage-backed
securities.14 These were relatively simple instruments that
merely “passed through” interest and principal to investors on a
pro-rata basis.15
The GSEs would purchase residential
mortgages, assemble them into homogenous pools, and sell rights
in the pool to institutional investors.16 Under this arrangement,

5

See National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1252 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006)); see also Peterson, supra note 4, at 2196.
6
Peterson, supra note 4, at 2196 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
See id.
8
See id. at 2198.
9
Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=
home&c=aboutus (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1716.
10
See David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory
Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 716–17 (2009).
11
See id. at 717.
12
See Peterson, supra note 4, at 2196.
13
See id. at 2198–99.
14
See id.
15
Id. at 2198 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16
See id. at 2198–99.
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investors could participate in a large and geographically
diversified number of mortgages, lessening the significance of
any one default.17 And, because the pool was homogenous,
investors could calculate default and refinancing risks more
easily. “Securitization of mortgage loans by the GSEs allowed
the larger capital markets to directly invest in American home
ownership at a lower cost than the older depository lending
model of business.”18 For the first time, global capital markets
were directly linked to residential mortgages.
Fannie and Freddie have since grown to immense
proportions. As of December 31, 2009, Freddie’s total mortgage
portfolio, including mortgage-related investments and the unpaid
principal balance of all other loans and securities that it
guaranteed, was $2.3 trillion.19 Similarly, as of September 30,
2009, Fannie held or guaranteed $3.2 trillion in mortgage debt.20
The total U.S. residential mortgage debt outstanding, which
includes single-family and multifamily loans, was approximately
$11.8 trillion as of December 31, 2009.21 In other words, Fannie
and Freddie directly or indirectly bear the risk for forty-seven
percent of the total outstanding U.S. residential mortgage debt.
Because of losses on more than $1 trillion of subprime and Alt-A
investments22—almost all of which were added to their single
family book of business between 2005 and 2007—Fannie and
Freddie have been under conservatorship by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency since September 2008.23
2.

The Subprime Market

Although lenders typically form their own precise
definitions, a subprime loan is simply one that carries “a
premium above the prevailing prime market rate that a borrower

17

See id. at 2199.
Id.
19
See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb.
24, 2010) [hereinafter Freddie Mac 2009 10-K Report].
20
See id. at 2.
21
See id. at 3.
22
See Schmudde, supra note 11, at 718–21. Alternative-A loans (“Alt-A”) are
those with a risk profile greater than prime loans but less than subprime loans.
23
See
About
Fannie
Mae,
http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?
page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); Frequently Asked Questions
About Freddie Mac, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/faqs/#8
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
18
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must pay.”24 The loan typically results not only in higher interest
rates, but pre-payment penalties, higher closing fees, and other
costs.25 “Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit
histories that include payment delinquencies, and possibly more
severe problems such as charge-offs, judgments, and
bankruptcies.”26
Several key pieces of federal legislation made subprime
lending possible. During the 1980s, Congress preempted state
laws on interest rate caps,27 permitted the use of loans with
variable interest rates and balloon payments,28 and allowed
interest deductions for mortgage debt, making it cheaper than
consumer debt.29 Congress also enacted legislation benefitting
the secondary market. By modifying the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and preempting state blue sky and legal investment laws,
Congress permitted state-chartered and regulated financial
24

Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the
Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 36 (2006),
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross
.pdf.
25
See id. at 32.
26
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., EXPANDED GUIDANCE
FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2 (2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/Boarddocs/SRletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf. Much of what complicates empirical
research into this area is a lack of precise definitions of “subprime.” Subprime
borrowers tend to exhibit one or more of the following characteristics:
(1) Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or more
60-day delinquencies in the last 24 months;
(2) Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24
months;
(3) Bankruptcy in the last 5 years;
(4) Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit
bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on the
product/collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an
equivalent default probability likelihood; and/or
(5) Debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater, or otherwise
limited ability to cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly
debt-service requirements from monthly income.
Id. at 3.
27
See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in various sections of
12 U.S.C.). The Act preempted laws governing the rates of any mortgage loan,
whether for purchase or refinance. See id. Since many subprime loans are
refinancing loans, this was a very significant feature of the Act.
28
See Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
96 Stat. 1545 (codified as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801–805
(2006)).
29
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified at
26 U.S.C. §§ 47, 1042 (2006)).

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 759 (2010)

2010]

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES

765

institutions, pension funds, insurance companies, trustees, and
other regulated entities to purchase “mortgage related
securities.”30 Congress also amended the Tax Code in 1986 to
create Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (“REMICs”) to
facilitate securitization of residential mortgages.31
Because of the legal changes described above, new loan
products came to the market. They offered borrowers greater
flexibility, but also posed a danger that uninformed consumers
would select a loan product irresponsibly. New products included
interest-only loans, adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”), option
mortgages, and even loans combining various characteristics of
each.32 Often, they were available to consumers with less than
full documentation of their income and assets.33
These
innovations, combined with a large amount of capital on the
secondary market, led to an explosion of mortgage lending:
Between 2000 and 2008, the amount of outstanding single-family
mortgages of all kinds rose from $5.1 trillion to over $11 trillion.34
Although it is generally agreed that the subprime market
was an enormous part of the overall market, there appears to be
a shortage of “consistent information available about the size of
the subprime market.”35 “[T]here are deficiencies in all available
single-family mortgage market data series, whether collected by
federal agencies, private firms, or trade associations. That is not
surprising, as data collection efforts were designed to address
specific areas of interest, and data collection is expensive and
30
See Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C. and
15 U.S.C.).
31
Though beyond the scope of this paper, much could be said about other
securitization structures, which become complex financial instruments that may
have obscured the true risks faced by investors by purporting to shield them from a
borrower’s default. The GSEs were among the leading innovators of residential
mortgage-backed securities. See The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the
Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government
Reform, 110th Cong. 139–40 (2008) [hereinafter Pinto] (statement of Edward J.
Pinto,
former
Chief
Credit
Officer,
Fannie
Mae),
available
at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090116_kd4.pdf.
32
See Schmudde, supra note 10, at 715–16.
33
See Pinto, supra note 31, at 161.
34
The Present Condition and Future Status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government
Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Financial Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 146 (2009)
[hereinafter Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing] (statement of James B. Lockhart
III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency).
35
Pinto, supra note 31, at 139.
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seldom done for ‘pure’ research.”36 Also, subprime and Alt-A
loans appear in both subprime and prime databases belonging to
the GSEs.37 In other words, because many conforming subprime
loans purchased by the GSEs were classified as prime, “there are
many more subprime and Alt-A mortgages outstanding today
than many people suppose.”38
For example, according to one estimate, the total amount of
subprime originations increased from $65 billion to $332 billion
between 1995 and 2003.39 According to another estimate, the
number of subprime originations increased from 962,000 to 3.2
million between 1998 and 2006.40 According to yet another
estimate, between 2001 and 2006, subprime originations
increased from $190 billion to $600 billion.41 Still another: The
“number of subprime originations increased more than five-fold
from 2000 through 2005—rising from approximately 457,000 to
about 2.3 million—before declining somewhat in 2006 and falling
off sharply in 2007.”42
Despite considerable variations in the data, it is impossible
to deny that nonprime originations increased dramatically in the
first half of this decade. High levels of global economic growth
made capital available to the secondary markets.43 And a tight

36
FORREST PAFENBERG, OFFICE OF FEDERAL HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT,
SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGES ORIGINATED AND OUTSTANDING: 1990–2004, at 4
(2005), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1151/mortmarket1990to2004.pdf.
37
See Pinto, supra note 31.
38
Id. at 140.
39
See Chomsisengphet, supra note 24, at 37 (citing data from the trade
magazine Inside B & E Lending).
40
See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME LENDING: A NET DRAIN
ON HOMEOWNERSHIP 4 (2007) (citing data from a proprietary database, Inside
Mortgage Finance, and SMR Research Corporation), available at http://www.
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/Net-Drain-in-HomeOwnership.pdf.
41
Current Trends in Foreclosures and What More Can Be Done To Prevent
Them: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement
of William B. Shear, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment;
Government Accountability Office), available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/?
a=Files.Serve&File_id=42eb8117-74c5-4378-a7e8-9505d858d78d.
42
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-848R, CHARACTERISTICS AND
PERFORMANCE OF NONPRIME MORTGAGES 6 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09848r.pdf.
43
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING 2008, at 19 (2008) [hereinafter JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES
OF HARVARD UNIV. 2008], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications
/markets/son2008/son2008.pdf.
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housing market drove home prices to new levels.44 Both of these
factors combined to create a thriving RMBS market, and the
GSEs were major drivers of this expansion.
Although detailed data about securitization is also plagued
with problems, it appears that the total volume of loans
securitized increased with the volume of origination. More
specifically, the secondary market’s appetite for securities backed
by subprime loans increased in the first half of the decade.
Between 1995 and 2003, the securitization rate of subprime loans
rose from 28.4% to 58.7%.45
Given that securitization increased with lending, the
inference to be drawn is that one event caused the other.46 As Dr.
Alan Greenspan observed: “The evidence strongly suggests that
without the excess demand from securitizers, subprime mortgage
originations (undeniably the original source of crisis) would have
been far smaller and defaults accordingly far fewer.”47
As the housing market imploded in 2007, the demand for
subprime loans from both consumers and investors dried up.
Between 2006 and 2007, subprime originations decreased from
over $139 billion to less than $14 billion.48 Loan performance
deteriorated as the foreclosure rate for subprime loans rose from
4.5% in the fourth quarter of 2006 to 8.7% a year later.49
At the height of the crisis, the state of the nation’s housing
was bleak. Delinquency and foreclosure rates skyrocketed; both

44

Id.
Chomsisengphet, supra note 24, at 38.
46
Dr. Greenspan summarizes how mortgage lenders were simply meeting the
demand of investors:
The big demand was not so much on the part of the borrowers as it was on
the part of the suppliers who were giving loans which really most people
couldn’t afford. We created something which was unsustainable. And it
eventually broke. If it weren’t for securitization, the subprime-loan market
would have been very significantly less than it is in size.
Jon Meacham & Daniel Gross, The Oracle Reveals All, NEWSWEEK, Sep. 24, 2007, at
32, 34.
47
The Financial Crisis and the Role of the Federal Regulators: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008)
[hereinafter Financial Crisis Hearing] (statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan, former
Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
48
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV. 2008, supra note 43, at
19.
49
Id. at 20.
45
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reached historic highs in 2008–2009.50 As introductory rates
expired and consumers suffered from a global economic
slowdown, foreclosure became a nation-wide problem of epic
proportions. For much of this decade, the highest foreclosure
rates existed in the economically distressed states of Ohio,
Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois.51 But in 2008, four other states
that had over indulged in risky loan products saw large increases
in foreclosures.52
Foreclosure rates in California, Arizona,
Nevada, and Florida rose from less than 0.9% at the start of 2007
to 5.9% by the end of 2008.53 In the last quarter of 2008, the
number of foreclosed loans climbed above “660,000 in these four
states alone, accounting for . . . 61 percent of the growth in
foreclosures nationwide.”54
In conclusion, this Section identified the key players in the
mortgage market, and explained how an increasingly liberal
legal environment led to a sharp increase in subprime lending
and subsequent securitization during the first half of the decade.
Critical to this expansion was the causal nexus between the
secondary market and the consumer market, making the GSEs
major enablers of the ensuing crisis. The next Section will
illustrate how the GSEs were key players in causing this market
explosion.

50
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS.& URBAN DEV., U.S. HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS: 2ND
QUARTER 4 (2009), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/ushmc/
winter09/USHMC_Q409.pdf.
The delinquency rate on all mortgage loans in the first quarter of 2009 (the
data are reported with a lag) was at its highest level since the series began
in 1972, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. The foreclosure
start rate on all mortgages also set a record high after remaining steady
since the second quarter of 2008. The delinquency rate for all mortgage
loans was 9.12 percent in the first quarter of 2009, up from 7.88 percent in
the fourth quarter of 2008 and up from 6.35 percent in the first quarter of
2008. The delinquency rate for subprime mortgage loans was 24.95 percent
in the first quarter of 2009, up from 21.88 percent in the fourth quarter of
2008 and up from 18.79 percent in the first quarter of 2008.
Id.
51
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING 2009, at 20 (2009) [hereinafter JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES
OF HARVARD UNIV. 2009], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/son/index.htm.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
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The “Ownership Society”: GSEs as Instruments of National
Policy and Political Gain

In understanding the secondary market’s role in subprime
lending, one must understand how the GSEs were used as
instruments both of federal policy and private gain. Because of
the enormous volume of securities issued each year, the GSEs
are the most significant players in the RMBS field. Due to their
implicit governmental guarantees and historically conservative
underwriting standards, investors tend to perform minimal due
diligence on GSE securities. But unless the GSEs are reformed,
marketplace discipline alone will not protect homeowners,
taxpayers, or investors from abuses of the GSEs’ enormous power
to shape the entire marketplace.
The story begins with the GSEs’ unique congressional
charters. Although the GSEs are publicly traded firms, they
share many attributes of public institutions. For example, each
has an obligation to support affordable housing, a large line of
credit with the treasury, five board members that the President
of the United States can appoint, and, most importantly, debt
that can be used to collateralize government deposits in private
banks.55
This last characteristic has contributed to the
perception that GSEs are government instrumentalities, and
thus would not be allowed to fail. In other words, the common
understanding was that their profits were privatized while their
financial risks were socialized.56
The GSEs are thus inherently conflicted. Because of their
implicit governmental backing, they were not discouraged from
taking excessive financial risks.57 But they were obligated to
produce profits for shareholders. And unlike other governmentfirms that were immune to market discipline, the GSEs were not
closely regulated.
55
See generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 1452 (West 2009) (establishing the corporate
powers of Freddie Mac); Peter J. Wallison & Charles W. Calomiris, The Last
Trillion-Dollar Commitment: The Destruction of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FIN.
SERVICES OUTLOOK, Sept. 2008, at 3, 5, available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/
28704 (explaining that the GSEs appear to have a “tacit understanding” with
Congress whereby the government will give them security if they concentrate on
providing affordable housing).
56
See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 5.
57
For example, their leverage could, by statute, exceed 100 to 1. See Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 147 (statement of James B. Lockhart
III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency).
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The first clear threat to their power came after the savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s (the “S&L Crisis”), which
caused Congress to add an affordable housing mandate to their
charters and created a full-time regulator called the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.58
Despite efforts to regulate them, the GSEs successfully
protected their charter powers by increasing influence in
Congress. Indeed, especially after the S&L Crisis, the GSEs
faced a “political risk” that Congress would alter their charters.59
But as Franklin Raines, ex-chairman of Fannie Mae once told his
investors, “we manage our political risk with the same intensity
that we manage our credit and interest rate risks.”60
Their method was as simple as it was effective: money.
Together, Fannie and Freddie contributed $14.6 million to
various congressional campaigns between 2000 and 2008.61 The
GSEs were “double-givers,” supporting members of both parties,
especially those sitting on committees with jurisdiction over their
industry.62
And when they could not buy allegiance, they instead bought
influence. Between 2000 and 2008, both GSEs spent a combined
$165 million lobbying Congress.63 The GSEs used this influence
to swiftly crush all proposals that might decrease their
profitability. During his thirty years in Congress as a former
member and chair of the House Financial Services Committee,
Jim Leach experienced the GSEs’ power first-hand: “When, for
instance, I once introduced a battery of constraining
amendments, including a doubling of capital requirements, to
legislation favorable to Fannie and Freddie, it took each less than

58

See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 2.
See Niles Steven Campbell, Fannie Mae Officials Try To Assuage Worried
Investors, REAL EST. FIN. TODAY, May 10, 1999, at 1, 20.
60
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61
See COMMON CAUSE, ASK YOURSELF WHY . . . THEY DIDN’T SEE THIS COMING
7–8 (2008), available at http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIw
G&b=4542875.
62
Id. at 8.
63
See id. at 7–8. GSE contributions are not always above board. “In 2006, the
Federal Elections Commission fined Freddie Mac $3.8 million for violations of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) when it held 70 campaign fundraisers—
raising about $1.7 million—mostly for members of the House Financial Services
Committee.” Id. at 8.
59
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48 hours to orchestrate both parties’ leadership to weigh in
against trimming their wings of privilege.”64
Their methods worked. Until their collapse in 2007, the
GSEs were both profitable, distributing billions in dividends each
year.65
Somewhat ironically, the most serious threat to the GSEs’
power and credibility was mostly of their own making. Both
experienced multi-billion dollar accounting scandals. “In 2003,
Freddie Mac understated billions in profits . . . . In 2004, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ruled that Fannie Mae had
overstated profits by an estimated $9 billion.”66
As a consequence of the public’s response to the accounting
scandals, the GSEs faced a political risk that Congress would
find the will to alter their charters and lessen their
independence. They therefore neede to use their immense
financial power to win the necessary political support and protect
their charters. They turned to Affordable Housing.
Affordable housing programs translated into real political
benefits for congressmen and the President. President George
W. Bush promoted the Ownership Society as an ideal model of
society, and home ownership was a central tenet.67 And when the
GSEs focused their affordable housing programs in a
Congressman’s or woman’s district, he or she could return to his
or her district claiming credit for the apparent economic
prosperity. These reverse kickbacks allowed the GSEs to win
allies in Congress.68
No other organization had the power to shape the market
like the GSEs. From 1997 through 2003, the GSEs’ market share
of all residential mortgage originations gradually grew to almost
fifty-five percent.69 They were exempt from state and local
64
Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 152 CONG. REC. S5217,
(daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. McCain) (discussing how the GSEs used
their lobbying power to avoid regulatory scrutiny prior to the accounting scandals of
2003 and 2004).
65
See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 5.
66
COMMON CAUSE, supra note 61, at 7.
67
See Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: America’s Ownership Society:
Expanding Opportunities (Aug. 9, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives
.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html.
68
See Pinto, supra note 31, at 142.
69
James B. Lockhart III, Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Speech Before the
National Association of Real Estate Editors: The Roles of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and the Federal Home Loan Banks in Stabilizing the Mortgage Market 1 (June 18,
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taxes.70 And because they could borrow money more cheaply
than other investors, they received a federal subsidy of an
estimated $6.5 billion.71
The President had, to some extent, the power to control the
GSEs. Since the early 1990s, Congress had given HUD the
power to set affordable housing goals for the GSEs, requiring
them to purchase a certain amount of “affordable” loans.72
Although an affordable loan is not necessarily a subprime loan,
the GSEs had allowed underwriting standards to deteriorate to
compete with private label securities. For example, in 1998,
Fannie began buying ninety-seven percent loan-to value (“LTV”)
mortgages, and in 2001, one-hundred percent LTV mortgages.73
After the scandals of 2003 and 2004, Fannie and Freddie were in
a perfect position to ramp up their affordable lending programs.
In response to policies of both the Clinton and Bush
administration’s desires to increase the level of home ownership,
HUD imposed aggressive affordable housing goals. Between
2000 and 2007, HUD increased the GSEs’ affordable housing
goals from forty-two percent to fifty-five percent.74 Acting in the
name of affordable housing, the GSEs began purchasing
subprime loans in earnest in 2005. Fannie and Freddie both
reported that “mortgages with subprime characteristics
comprised substantial percentages of all 2005–2007 mortgages
2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2919/Lockhart percent20Speech
percent20to percent20National percent20Association percent20of percent20Real
percent20Estate percent20Editors-06-18-09.pdf.
70
See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1452(e) (West 2009) (exempting Freddie Mac from federal,
state, and local income taxes); Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the
Crisis; Subprime Loans Labeled ‘Affordable,’ WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at A1.
71
Leonnig, supra note 70.
72
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992,
Pub. L. 102-550, § 1333, 106 Stat. 3672, 3958 (1992). The Act allowed HUD to set
affordable housing goals for the GSEs, essentially requiring them to purchase
certain amounts of “affordable” loans. Id. Not all affordable loans are subprime,
however.
73
See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 6. It should be noted here that the
GSEs were only prohibited by statute from buying loans above a certain amount. See
12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2) (2006); id. § 1717(b). They were never required to buy loans
conforming to any particular credit quality. See 12 U.S.C.. § 1454(a)(1);
12 U.S.C.A. § 1719(a)(1) (West 2010). However, to purchase loans with a LTV ratio
greater than eighty percent, due to restrictions in their charters, they had to rely on
external credit enhancement. See 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2); id. § 1717(b)(5)(C).
74
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OVERVIEW OF THE GSES’ HOUSING
GOAL PERFORMANCE, 2000–2007, at 4 tbl.1 (2008) [hereinafter OVERVIEW], available
at http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/GSE/gse2007.pdf.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 759 (2010)

2010]

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES

773

the compan[ies] acquired.”75 They bought no-documentation
loans, interest-only loans, negative amortization ARMs, loans
with LTVs exceeding ninety percent, loans with FICO scores
below 620, and Alt-A loans.76 In 2006, for example, nearly thirty
percent of certain affordable loans purchased by the GSEs had a
LTV ratio of ninety-five percent or greater.77 And they bought
them in great quantities. In 2005, the GSEs financed 7.4 million
units of housing through their affordable housing programs, and
6.6 million in 2006.78 As of 2008, Fannie and Freddie held or
guaranteed just over $1 trillion in subprime debt. 79
Fannie and Freddie also enabled other major players in the
financial world to become involved in the subprime market. In
2004, GSE executives made it known to the mortgage industry
that they would aggressively pursue subprime lending, thereby
encouraging originators to focus on such loans.80 Former Fannie
Mae Chairman and CEO Franklin Raines declared to “a packed
house” at the Mortgage Bankers Association’s 2004 Annual
Convention, “We have to push products and opportunities to
people who have lesser credit quality.”81 At the same conference,
Richard Syron, former CEO of Freddie Mac, noted that Freddie’s
philosophy had changed, and only a small group of leaders would
determine the amount of risk the company was willing to take.82
Syron also noted that he would encourage lenders to make loans
“with lower down payments and credit scores.”83
Raines and Syron delivered on their promises. The GSEs
became the largest purchasers of private-label subprime
securities (“PLS”), investing more than $400 billion in subprimebacked securities.84
Overall, banks issued PLS in greater
75

Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 7.
Id.
77
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PROFILES OF GSE MORTGAGE
PURCHASES IN 2005–2007, at 30 tbl.7d-2006 (2008), available at http://www.huduser.
org/portal/datasets/GSE/profiles_05-07.pdf.
78
Id. at 14 tbl.4-2005, 15 tbl.4-2006.
79
See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 1. Between 2005 and 2007,
“[r]oughly 33 percent of the companies’ business involved buying or guaranteeing
these risky mortgages, compared with 14 percent in 2005.” Zachary A. Goldfarb,
Affordable-Housing Goals Scaled Back, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2008, at A11.
80
See Pinto, supra note 31, at 149.
81
Neil J. Morse, Looking for New Customers, MORTGAGE BANKING, Dec. 1, 2004,
at 109.
82
See id.
83
Id.
84
See COMMON CAUSE, supra note 61, at 8.
76
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quantities than the GSEs.85 But because HUD allowed these
securities to count towards their subprime lending goals, the
GSEs could purchase certain tranches from other financial
institutions.86
This was favorable to the GSEs, who had
experienced a decrease in their market share after the 2003 and
2004 accounting scandals and because of an increase in PLS
issuance.87
Between 2004 and 2006, Fannie and Freddie
purchased $434 billion in subprime-backed securities, roughly
twenty-five percent of all PLS issued by other financial
institutions.88 Fannie and Freddie encouraged the growth of this
market not only by purchasing the securities, but also by lending
it an aura of credibility, thereby encouraging other institutional
investors to participate.89
Ultimately, these investments performed poorly and were
disastrous for the GSEs. As Freddie recently reported: “At
December 31, 2008 and 2007, our net unrealized losses on
mortgage-related securities were $38.2 billion and $10.1 billion,
respectively.”90
Fannie and Freddie’s abuse of affordable housing programs
caused the most damage in the communities most in need of their
responsible administration.
“Poor neighborhoods and often
African-American and Latino neighborhoods have seen the
highest incidence of subprime loans and housing foreclosures.”91
Lower-income and minority home buyers were defaulting at a
rate at least three times higher than other borrowers.92 The
industry was rife with sharp practices that made matters worse.
85
See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 146 (statement of
James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency) (“Issuance of
private-label subprime securities surged beginning in 2004, when 46 percent of all
single-family mortgage-backed security issued were PLS. The PLS share peaked at
56 percent in 2006, but fell to 4 percent in 2008.”).
86
See id. at 147 (“To maintain profitability of the retained portfolios and to meet
HUD-designated affordable housing goals, each Enterprise increased purchases of
PLS backed by alternative mortgages and of high-risk whole loans.”).
87
See id. at 146–47.
88
See JAMES LARDNER, BEYOND THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN: ADDRESSING THE
CURRENT CRISIS, AVOIDING A FUTURE CATASTROPHE 10 (2008), available at
http://www.demos.org/pubs/housingpaper_6_24_08.pdf; Kathleen Day, Villains in the
Mortgage Mess? Start at Wall Street. Keep Going., WASH. POST, June 1, 2008, at B1.
89
See LARDNER, supra note 88, at 10.
90
Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Mar. 11,
2009).
91
COMMON CAUSE, supra note 61, at 3.
92
See Leonnig, supra note 70, at A1.
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For example, by the end of the subprime bubble, more than half
of all subprime loans were going to people with credit scores that
could have qualified them for traditional mortgages.93
Fannie and Freddie took a leading role in the subprime crisis
that crippled the global economy. “What happens to mortgage
credit now rests in the hands of the federal government.”94 As
Congress formulates new policy and legislation to deal with the
subprime lending crisis, it must look to the future. It cannot
overlook the GSEs’ role in subprime lending.
III. CURRENT GOVERNING LAW AND CRITIQUE
This Part provides a summary and a critique of the legal
status quo governing the GSEs. Section A discusses the most
fundamental piece of legislation affecting the GSEs: their unique
congressional charters. Then, it describes Congress’s latest
efforts at regulating the GSEs with the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008.95 Section B discusses the authority of the
regulator for the GSEs: the FHFA.
Section C critiques the current regime. Current law can be
described as Congress’s attempt to balance at least two
competing and sometimes opposed concerns. One concern is
ensuring the financial safety of the GSEs by requiring safe
financial practices. The other is an attempt to effectuate the
longstanding federal policy of attaining high levels of home
ownership by using the GSEs to increase homeownership among
low-income borrowers. The Section argues that, although the
GSEs should retain much of their unique public/private nature,
the current law does too little to address the moral hazards
inherent in that structure. This hazard led to a primary cause of
the subprime crisis: abuse of the GSEs affordable housing
mission.
First, the Part argues that the affordable housing mission is
vaguely defined and subject to abuse. Second, it contends that an
essential part of controlling the GSEs’ behavior is limiting or

93
See Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very CreditWorthy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1.
94
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV. 2009, supra note 51, at 2.
95
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat.
2654.
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curtailing their awesome lobbying power, which the current law
fails to do.96
A.

The GSEs’ Core Legislation: The Charters

Congress created the GSEs and outlined their key powers
through unique corporate charters.97 The original charters have
each been amended several times over the years, but the most
comprehensive version of each charter has been codified to title
12 of the United States Code. Although not enacted into law,
title 12 of the United States Code does incorporate all of
Congress’s most recent amendments to the charters, as well as
the most current law concerning the regulator: the FHFA.
Fannie and Freddie’s charters are, in all essential respects,
identical. The charters grant the two GSEs virtually identical
organizational structures, corporate powers to buy and sell
mortgages, and corporate powers to issue securities.98 For
convenience, this Section will refer to Freddie Mac’s charter, but
will note the places where Fannie Mae’s charter differs in
significant respects.
1.

Basic Purpose

The purpose of the corporation is laid out in the beginning of
Fannie Mae’s charter.99 There, Congress declared that the
purpose of the Act was “to establish secondary market facilities
for residential mortgages, [and] to provide that the operations
thereof shall be financed by private capital to the maximum

96

Pursuant to its broad powers as conservator, the FHFA stopped all of the
GSEs’ lobbying after initiating the conservatorship. See Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 142 (statement of James B. Lockhart III, Director,
Federal Housing Finance Agency). However, once the conservatorship ends, nothing
in current law would prohibit them from resuming their lobbying or campaign
contributions.
97
Congress created Freddie Mac with the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 451 (1970) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C.A. § 1452 (West 2009)). Congress created the current version of Fannie Mae
with the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1252
(1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006)).
98
For convenience, this section will refer to Freddie Mac’s charter, but will note
the places where Fannie Mae’s charter differs in significant respects.
99
12 U.S.C. § 1716. Freddie’s charter contains nearly identical language. See
12 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006).
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extent feasible.”100 To that end, Congress required the GSEs to
meet five goals. They are to
(1) provide stability in the secondary market for residential
mortgages; (2) respond appropriately to the private capital
market; (3) provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market
for residential mortgages . . . by increasing the liquidity of
mortgage investments and improving the distribution of
investment capital available . . . [;] (4) promote access to
mortgage credit throughout the Nation . . . by increasing the
liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the
distribution of investment capital available for residential
mortgage financing; and (5) manage and liquidate federally
owned mortgage portfolios in an orderly manner.101

2.

Basic Organization

Freddie is a government-sponsored enterprise, created as “a
body corporate under the direction of a Board of Directors.”102
The board consists of thirteen directors, and has, at all times,
at least 1 person from the homebuilding industry, at least 1
person from the mortgage lending industry, at least 1 person
from the real estate industry, and at least 1 person from an
organization that has represented consumer or community
interests for not less than 2 years or 1 person who has
demonstrated a career commitment to the provision of housing
for low-income households.103

Board members serve for one-year terms and cannot receive
compensation for their services if they are employees of the
federal government.104
Freddie has common stock, each share of which is entitled to
one vote.105 Although Freddie cannot restrict the transferability
of these shares, it can place “limitations on concentration of
ownership” of common shares as it sees fit,106 presumably to
ensure diffused ownership and prevent takeovers. Freddie may

100
101
102
103
104
105
106

12 U.S.C. § 1716.
Id.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1452(a)(1) (West 2009).
Id. § 1452(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 1452(a)(2)(A), (D).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006).
Id. § 1453(a).
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also have preferred stock, the terms being set by the board of
directors, but preferred shares have no voting rights.107
The charter gives Freddie many ordinary corporate powers.
For example, it enjoys perpetual succession until dissolved by an
act of Congress, can make contracts and release claims, sue and
be sued, and can determine its necessary expenses, including the
salaries of its employees.108 However, “a significant portion of
potential compensation of all executive officers . . . shall be based
on the performance of the Corporation.”109
The GSEs are headquartered in Washington, D.C., and are
exempt from federal, state, and local taxes.110
3.

Secondary Market Activities

The most important aspect of the charters enables the GSEs
to operate in the secondary market with considerable flexibility,
autonomy, and discretion. The charter accomplishes this by
authorizing Freddie to purchase certain mortgages and then to
issue securities backed by those mortgages, as well as other
kinds of debt instruments.
Freddie is authorized “to purchase, and make commitments
to purchase, residential mortgages.”111 The statute defines the
term “residential mortgage” much more broadly than it is
conventionally used.
For example, the term includes real
property containing structures consisting of “one or more
condominium units.”112 It also includes loans secured by mobile
homes, loans used to renovate residential properties, refinance
loans, and second lien loans.113 Freddie is not authorized to
originate mortgages.

107

See id. § 1455(f). Dividend payments on all common and preferred stock have
been suspended during the conservatorship. FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, STRATEGIC
PLAN 2009–2014, at 21 (2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/14476/
FHFA_StrategicPlan_2009-2014n.pdf.
108
See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1452(c).
109
Id. § 1452(c)(9). Executive compensation is subject to some limitations. The
GSEs must submit a report to Congress on “the comparability of the compensation
policies of the Corporation with the compensation policies of other similar
businesses.” Id. § 1452(h)(1)(A). Essentially, this provision guarantees that so long
as GSE executives earn no more than executives at other extremely large financial
firms, then Congress will not take issue with their compensation.
110
Id. § 1452(a)(1), (e).
111
12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(1) (2006).
112
Id. § 1451(h).
113
See id.
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The statute confines Freddie’s activities to residential
mortgages, which “are deemed by” Freddie to “meet generally the
purchase standards imposed by private institutional mortgage
investors.”114 The statute authorizes Freddie to classify mortgage
sellers based on various financial characteristics to “establish
requirements, and impose charges or fees, which may be
regarded as elements of pricing.”115 In other words, Freddie need
not treat all sellers equally, nor must it make all programs
available to all sellers, so long as its classifications and
discriminations “bear a rational relationship to the purposes or
provisions of [the statute].”116 This language is absent from
Fannie’s charter.
The statute imposes few restrictions on the kinds of
mortgages Freddie can buy. Freddie cannot buy a mortgage with
a LTV ratio greater than eighty percent, unless one of three
conditions is met.117 Two conditions apply to the seller. The
seller can retain at least ten percent of the mortgage, or the
seller can agree to repurchase the mortgage in the event of
default.118 In the alternative, Freddie can obtain a guarantee or
insurance on the amount of principal in excess of eighty percent
of the value of the collateral from “a qualified insurer as
determined by the Corporation.”119 This provision is of enormous
importance because it allows Freddie great flexibility in
purchasing external credit enhancements such as credit
derivative swaps. This provision enabled the GSEs to purchase
subprime loans.
The statute’s most concrete limitations are on the size of
loans that Freddie may purchase.120 The limitations apply to
both first and second lien mortgages but allow some flexibility for
high-priced markets, as well as for Alaska, Hawaii, and the
Virgin Islands.121 Each year, the limitations are adjusted by

114

Id. § 1454(a)(1).
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. § 1454(a)(2).
118
Id.
119
Id. (emphasis added).
120
See id. (“Such limitations shall not exceed $417,000 for a mortgage secured
by a single-family residence, $533,850 for a mortgage secured by a two family
residence, $645,300 for a mortgage secured by a three family residence, and
$801,950 for a mortgage secured by a four family residence.”).
121
See id.
115
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FHFA.122 Freddie is authorized to lend against the mortgages it
holds, provided that “the lending activities shall be conducted on
such terms as will reasonably prevent excessive use of the
Corporation’s facilities.”123
The statute also authorizes Freddie to sell mortgages with or
without recourse. Freddie may sell mortgages according to
“terms and conditions relating to resale, repurchase, guaranty,
substitution, replacement, or otherwise,” which Freddie
prescribes.124
Most importantly, Freddie may issue debt instruments and
mortgage-backed securities.125 These securities are exempt from
regulation under the securities laws.126 However, Freddie may
not guarantee any RMBS unless it has first purchased the
underlying mortgage.127 The statute requires Freddie to indicate
that the securities “are not guaranteed by the United States and
do not constitute a debt or obligation of the United States.”128
However, the statute does provide that the securities “may be
accepted as security for all fiduciary, trust, and public funds, the
investment or deposits of which shall be under the authority and
control of the United States or any officers thereof.”129 The
statute gives the Secretary of the Treasury ordinary authority to
purchase up to $2.25 billion worth of debt or securities from
Freddie.130 The statute also requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to approve any new loan programs.131
4.

Oversight and Reporting

The charter itself imposes some obligations on Freddie that
increase its transparency and that help Congress ascertain
whether Freddie is fulfilling its mission. The statute authorizes
the Comptroller General to audit Freddie under “such rules and
122

See id.
See id. § 1454(a)(5).
124
Id. § 1454(a)(3).
125
See id. § 1455(a).
126
Id. § 1455(g).
127
Id. § 1455(h)(1).
128
Id. § 1455(h)(2). This provision has done little to prevent the common
perception that obligations and securities are, in reality, guaranteed by the United
States. See Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored
Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 583–85 (2005).
129
12 U.S.C.A. § 1452(g) (West 2009).
130
See 12 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (2006).
131
Id. § 1454(c).
123
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regulations” as he or she may prescribe.132 The statute grants
the Comptroller full access to Freddie’s books and records.133 It
also requires a private audit annually.134 Freddie must also
submit to the FHFA annual and quarterly reports on its financial
condition.135
The statute imposes a duty on Freddie to maintain extensive
amounts of data relating to its one- to four-family home mortgage
portfolios, including such information as “the income, census
tract location, race, and gender of mortgagors,” the LTV ratio,
and whether the mortgage is new or seasoned.136 Freddie must
also prepare extensive reports for both the House and Senate on
all of its activities.137 These reports must be disclosed to the
public.138
In sum, Fannie and Freddie exhibit many typical corporate
characteristics. They have perpetual succession, are governed by
a board of thirteen directors, have both common and preferred
stock, and possess the same legal capacity to contract and sue as
any other corporation. Their corporate powers are specific and
are limited to purchasing and securitizing certain residential
mortgages. But they also enjoy special privileges, such as an
exclusion from state, federal, and local taxes. Interestingly, the
GSEs’ commitment to affordable housing is not evident from
their charters alone. The charters provide only for an affordable
housing advisory council to “advise the Corporation regarding
possible methods for promoting affordable housing for low- and
moderate-income families.”139 The true scope of the affordable
housing mission only becomes apparent after a close analysis of
the legislation that created and governs the FHFA.
B.

The Regulator

Congress recently overhauled the GSEs’ regulatory scheme
with the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008.140 The most significant change affecting the GSEs was the
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

12 U.S.C.A. § 1456(b)(1) (West 2009).
See id. § 1456(b)(2).
See id. § 1456(d).
Id. § 1456(c).
Id. § 1456(e)(1).
See id. § 1456(f).
Id.
Id. § 1456(g)(1).
Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).
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creation of the FHFA, an independent agency tasked with
oversight of the GSEs and the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks
(the “Banks”). If the charters created any ambiguity about the
GSEs’ duty to participate in affordable housing, the Act clarifies
the intent of Congress. The findings show that the GSEs “have
an affirmative obligation to facilitate the financing of affordable
housing . . . in a manner consistent with their overall public
purposes, while maintaining a strong financial condition and a
reasonable economic return.”141
Congress also seems to
recognize, however, that an affordable housing mission is
susceptible to abuse, and found that “an entity regulating the
[GSEs] should have sufficient autonomy from the enterprises and
special interest groups.”142 To that end, Congress created a
highly independent agency with considerable authority over the
GSEs.
1.

The Agency and the Director

FHFA is “an independent agency of the Federal
Government,”143 with regulatory authority over the GSEs and the
Banks. Unlike the previous regulator, FHFA is not situated
within any other executive department. Rather, the agency is
independent and is fully funded by the GSEs and the Banks,
rather than by Congressional appropriations.144 Although HERA
created a Federal Housing Finance Oversight Board, it has no
real authority; it instead acts in a purely advisory role to FHFA’s
director.145
Virtually all of the agency’s power is vested in its director.
The director is appointed for five year terms by the President,
acting with the advice and consent of the Senate, and must “have
a demonstrated understanding of financial management or
oversight, and have a demonstrated understanding of capital
markets, including the mortgage securities markets and housing
finance.”146 In an effort to increase the director’s independence,
141

12 U.S.C. § 4501(7) (2006).
Id. § 4501(5).
143
12 U.S.C.A. § 4511(a) (West 2009).
144
See id. § 4516(a). The previous regulator was also funded by the GSEs. See
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134, § 211, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-288 (providing that the GSEs would fund the
regulator).
145
See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4513a(a) (West 2009).
146
Id. § 4512(b)(1), (2).
142
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HERA provides that the director can only be removed by the
President “for cause.”147 Previously, there were no restrictions on
the President’s removal powers.148 The director may not have
any financial interest in the GSEs, hold any position of office in a
GSE, or have served as an executive officer or director of a GSE
for three years prior to his or her appointment as director of the
FHFA.149
2.

The Director’s Duties and Powers

The director is given considerable power over the GSEs. In
the most general sense, the director must ensure that each GSE
“operates in a safe and sound manner, including maintenance of
adequate capital and internal controls.”150 The director must also
ensure that the GSEs’ activities “foster liquid, efficient,
competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets,”151
and that the GSEs comply with applicable law.152 The director is
authorized to review and “reject any acquisition or transfer of a
controlling interest in a” GSE.153
On a more specific level, the Act gives the director power
over more particular aspects of the GSEs’ operation. For
example, the director has broad authority to establish standards
relating to the adequacy of internal controls and information
systems, management of interest rate and credit risks,
management of asset growth, and even the size of investments
and acquisitions of assets “to ensure that they are consistent
with the purposes of this chapter and the authorizing
statutes.”154
Some of the director’s most important powers concern his or
her ability to regulate the GSEs’ capital levels. The director has
the authority to establish “risk-based capital requirements for
the enterprises to ensure that the enterprises operate in a safe
and sound manner, maintaining sufficient capital and reserves to
support the risks that arise in the operations and management of
147

See id. § 4512(b)(2).
See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
§ 1312, 106 Stat. 3672, 3945.
149
See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4512(g).
150
Id. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(i).
151
Id. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(ii).
152
See id. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(iii), (iv).
153
Id. § 4513(a)(2)(A).
154
Id. § 4513b(a).
148
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the enterprises.”155 This represents a considerable increase in
the director’s authority. Previously, the director only had
authority to apply a Risk Based Capital Test that determined the
GSEs’ appropriate levels of capitalization.156
In addition to the director’s discretionary power, the Act also
imposes minimum capital levels. The statute requires that the
GSEs keep minimum capital levels equal to the sum of 2.5% of
on-balance sheet assets, plus 0.45% of the unpaid principal
balance of outstanding mortgage-backed securities, plus 0.45% of
other off-balance sheet obligations.157 Thus, for every $100 worth
of outstanding securities the GSEs issue or guarantee, they must
keep 45¢ in cash on hand. Of course, the director can impose
higher capital levels, and the statute provides an extensive
scheme of controls designed to ensure that the GSEs comply with
such rules.158
The director has the obligation to approve all new GSE
products and programs.159 To gain approval, the products or
programs must be both “consistent with the safety and soundness
of the enterprise or the mortgage finance system” and in the
“public interest.”160 The director must receive public comments
on new products and programs according to the Administrative
Procedure Act.161
The Act imposes other duties on the director as well. The
director must require regular reports from the GSEs on their
operations,162 as well as make regular reports to Congress
concerning the GSEs’ housing goals.163
The Act imposes
sanctions if a GSE misstates information in an annual or special
report required to be made to the director. The penalties
imposed by the Act are $2,000 for negligent errors, $20,000 per
day for each day a known negligent mistake is not corrected, and

155

Id. § 4611(a)(1).
See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
§ 1361(a), 106 Stat. 3672, 3941.
157
12 U.S.C.A. § 4612(a).
158
See, e.g., id. § 4615 (enumerating actions the director may take with respect
to undercapitalized enterprises).
159
See id. § 4541(a).
160
Id. § 4541(b).
161
See id. § 4541(c)(2).
162
Id. § 4541(a)(1).
163
Id. § 4544(a).
156
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$1,000,000 per day for when the GSE acted “knowingly or with
reckless disregard” for the accuracy of the report.164
3.

The Housing Goals

The most important part of HERA gives the director of
FHFA complete discretion in setting the GSEs’ housing goals.
These regulations are promulgated in accordance with the
informal rulemaking procedure of the Administrative Procedure
Act,165 a procedure that gives the director considerable discretion.
The Act requires the director to set housing goals for several
categories of housing, including single- to four-family homes,
multi-family housing, and low- and very low-income housing.166
A GSE may petition the director to reduce these goals, but the
director may only reduce the goals if the “market and economic
conditions or the financial condition of the enterprise require
such action” or if efforts to meet the goal “would result in the
constraint of liquidity, over-investment in certain market
segments, or other consequences contrary to the intent of this
[Act].”167
The Act imposes a duty to make loans in support of
affordable housing. The Act does not define “affordable housing”
or “underserved markets.” Rather, it contemplates housing goals
in terms of the relative income of borrowers targeted by a
particular program. An “affordable loan” is, strictly speaking,
simply one made to a borrower who earns at or below the median
income for his or her area.168 The Act is silent about particular
credit characteristics of borrowers. Rather, it gives the GSEs
considerable flexibility in engineering underwriting standards to
meet housing goals. The director is required to set goals for lowand very-low-income families, which are to be expressed as a
percentage of total mortgages purchased by the GSEs.169

164

Id. § 4514(c)(2).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2006).
166
12 U.S.C.A. § 4562 (West 2009).
167
Id. § 4564(b).
168
A “moderate income” borrower earns less than the median income. See id.
§ 4502(16). A “low-income” borrower earns less than eighty percent of the median
income. See id. § 4502(14). A “very low-income” borrower earns less than fifty
percent of the median income. See id. § 4502(24). And an “extremely low-income”
borrower earns less than thirty percent of the median income. See id. § 4502(27).
169
See id. § 4562.
165
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In some instances, the Act specifically calls for “flexible”
underwriting standards. For example, to benefit markets for
manufactured housing and certain projects subsidized under
other federal programs, the Act requires the GSEs to “provide
leadership to the market in developing loan products and flexible
underwriting guidelines to facilitate a secondary market for
mortgages for very low-, low-, and moderate-income families.”170
The Act also requires the GSEs to engage with other
organizations to further the federal policy of homeownership.
The GSEs must “design programs and products that facilitate the
use of assistance provided by the Federal Government and State
and local governments.”171 They must also “develop relationships
with nonprofit and for-profit organizations that develop and
finance housing and with State and local governments, including
housing finance agencies.”172 Also, they must take “affirmative
steps to . . . assist primary lenders to make housing credit
available in areas with concentrations of low-income and
minority families.”173
The director also has considerable power to require the GSEs
to comply with these goals. For example, once the director has
determined that a GSE will not meet its housing goals, he or she
may require that the GSE submit a housing plan detailing how
the GSE intends to meet the goal.174 If the GSE does not comply
with this order, the director may impose civil sanctions up to
$50,000 for each day that the failure occurs.175
The Act gives the director discretion in determining which
loans count towards these goals, but this discretion is not
unlimited. For example, if the director finds that a particular
mortgage was made on terms “contrary to good lending practices,
inconsistent with safety and soundness, or unauthorized for
purchase by the enterprises,” then it may not be counted towards
satisfying the housing goals.176
In sum, HERA created an independent agency with more
power over the GSEs than at any other time in their history.
170

Id. § 4565(a)(1).
Id. § 4565(b)(1).
172
Id. § 4565(b)(2).
173
Id. § 4565(b)(3).
174
This determination is
12 U.S.C. § 4566.
175
Id. § 4585(a)(4), (b)(2).
176
Id. § 4562(i).
171
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FHFA can control their capital levels, can determine which new
products and programs make it to the market, and can exercise
complete discretion over their affordable housing goals. The
director can require the GSEs to engage with certain
underserved markets and has considerable discretion in
determining if any goal has been met. He or she can encourage
the GSEs to develop “flexible underwriting guidelines” to ensure
that the nation’s poorest individuals have access to loans.
C.

Critique of the Current Regime

1.

The Charter Should Remain Largely Unchanged

The GSEs have, for the most part, accomplished the goals
Congress gave them. The United States has one of the most
liquid and sophisticated markets for residential mortgages in the
world. For decades, global capital has had the opportunity to
invest in domestic housing markets, and the GSEs have been
among the most innovative creators of RMBS products. Because
the board has the ability to create preferred shares on their own
terms, and because executive compensation is required to be
determined with respect to performance, executives and
shareholders have the potential to earn great wealth.
Private ownership has, therefore, encouraged efficiency and
innovation in the RMBS marketplace. Because Fannie and
Freddie compete with one another in identical markets using
nearly identical powers and privileges, consumers are generally
protected from abuses. Indeed, the subprime crisis was not, in
terms of underwriting standards, a race to the top. Rather, it
was a race to the bottom as each GSE tried to gain greater and
greater shares of the growing subprime market.
The considerable success of the GSEs in accomplishing their
core mission illustrates that the recent crisis was a failure of
execution, and not of form. Unfortunately, the perceived GSE
structure—privatization of profits and socialization of risk—
creates a moral hazard that may lead to excessive risk taking by
management.
Nowhere does this moral hazard become more apparent than
when one considers the dilemma imposed upon management by
the need to keep capital reserves. Cash required to be on hand
for capital reserves is not available for disbursement as a
dividend. As noted previously, the GSEs hold or guarantee over
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$5 trillion in mortgage debt. Given these enormous numbers,
tiny adjustments in required capital reserves can have an
enormous impact on the amount of money available for
dividends. Management has an incentive to keep capital levels
as low as possible to maximize distributions to shareholders.
And because the market perceives an implied governmental
guarantee of all GSE products and debts, it will not necessarily
incentivize management to maintain conservative capital levels.
Voluntary efforts at safety will not work. This risk is inherent to
their structure and can only be countered by a strong regulator
with clearly defined powers and duties.
2.

HERA’s Strengths and Shortcomings: a Powerful Regulator,
a Vague Affordable Housing Mandate, and Unchecked
Political Influence

Never before have the GSEs been regulated so strongly. The
FHFA is considerably more independent than previous
regulators because it is not under the control of HUD. This is of
critical importance because HUD—whose core mission is to
encourage home ownership—was conflicted in its mission of
regulating the largest enabler of mortgage markets in the world.
It is, therefore, an improvement that FHFA’s director is both
appointed and removed by the President and is not under the
influence of any other executive department.
Among HERA’s many strengths are the sweeping powers it
gives the director of FHFA to ensure that the GSEs operate
safely. FHFA’s powers to regulate capital levels, control the size
of mortgage portfolios, approve all new products, and have
extensive access to all books and records are likely to prevent
much risky behavior by GSE management.
Despite these improvements, HERA suffers from
considerable defects. The affordable housing mission is vague.
For example, aside from a broad command to ensure that the
GSEs operate safely, there is no specific command addressing
subprime loans.177 The Act requires the GSEs to purchase loans
made to low-income borrowers, but it does not prohibit loans
177
The closest the Act comes to speaking directly to subprime loans is in
12 U.S.C. § 4601(a) (2006). This provision requires the GSEs to report to Congress
on how underwriting standards impact the affordable housing mission. See id. Yet
this provision has been in place since 1992 and did nothing to discourage excessive
managerial risk taking and poor business practices.
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made to borrowers with any particular credit characteristic. Nor
does the Act say how many subprime loans in the portfolio are
“too many.” It does not prohibit the GSEs from purchasing any
particular type of private label RMBS. In some instances, the
Act requires the GSEs to develop “flexible underwriting
guidelines” to further the affordable housing mission.178
The Act also gives FHFA’s director complete discretion to set
housing goals. Indeed, under HERA there is no reason why the
director of FHFA could not authorize an affordable housing
program exactly like the ones adopted by the GSEs between 2005
and 2007. Not only does HERA not provide for judicial review of
affordable housing goals, but, under the Administrative
Procedure Act, no federal court would review a decision that
HERA commits to agency discretion by law.179
HERA also does not address the GSEs’ ability to influence
policy and legislation in Congress. The GSEs accomplished this
in two primary ways. First, GSEs focus programs in particular
districts to curry congressional favor. To perform these so-called
“reverse kickbacks” the GSEs make “affordable” loans more
available in certain congressional districts than others, thereby
fostering the perception of prosperity.180 Second, GSEs still can
influence through lobbying and campaign contributions.
The Act addresses neither reverse kickbacks nor lobbying or
contributions. Reverse kickbacks and lobbying have, for many
years, made the GSEs somewhat independent from congressional
or executive control. But, as recent events have illustrated, the
GSEs must remain securely under the thumb of their regulator
and Congress. The Act encourages reverse earmarking by
requiring the GSEs to “develop relationships with nonprofit and
for-profit organizations that develop and finance housing and
with State and local governments, including housing finance
agencies.”181 This provision could be applied selectively to certain
districts in an attempt to curry favor with individual
congressmen and women.
In sum, HERA provides many badly needed reforms while
failing in other critical areas. Its positive changes include
increasing the autonomy of FHFA and its director and giving the
178
179
180
181

See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4565(a)(1) (West 2009).
See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006).
See Pinto, supra note 31, at 142.
12 U.S.C.A. § 4565(b).
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director wide discretion over various aspects of GSE policy and
practice. These reforms help counter the moral-hazard inherent
to the GSEs unique public/private nature. However, while the
Act imposes an affordable housing mission, it fails to clearly
describe how that mission is to be executed. Although the Act
broadly requires the director to ensure sound business practices,
it does not specifically prohibit any risky practice. In this sense,
the director’s total discretion is a potential liability. Nor does the
Act constrain the GSEs’ proven ability to buy influence in
Congress.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES
This Part will propose two changes designed to avoid abuse
of the GSEs’ affordable housing program. First, the GSEs’
lobbying and campaign activities should be permanently
eliminated. Second, the GSEs’ affordable housing mission be
clarified in three ways. The federal government should offer an
explicit guarantee on “core” securities. Congress should amend
HERA to prohibit GSEs from purchasing private label RMBS.
Finally, HERA should be amended to place a cap on the amount
of affordable mortgages that the GSEs can purchase, thereby
limiting the director’s discretion in setting affordable housing
goals.
A.

GSE Lobbying Should Be Curtailed

The GSEs have a well documented history of abusing their
lobbying power in Congress. Some of this criticism comes
directly from legislators themselves.182 Some criticism comes
from academics,183 while other criticism comes from the press,184
182
See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5217 (2006) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(discussing how the GSEs used their lobbying power to avoid regulatory scrutiny
prior to the accounting scandals of 2003 and 2004); JAMES A. LEACH, FIXING FANNIE
FREDDIE (2008), available at http://www.iop.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site
AND
/storage/fckeditor/file/Fannie%20and%20Freddie.pdf(noting that GSE lobbying
resulted in “an eight-fold growth in mortgages owned by these two GSEs in less than
two decades”).
183
See, e.g., Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled House of Cards: Examining How the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails To Resolve the Foreclosure Crisis,
61 OKLA. L. REV. 561, 582 (2008) (criticizing HERA for allowing the GSEs to
continue their lobbying activities).
184
See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Charles Duhigg, Loan Titans Paid McCain
Adviser Nearly $2 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A16; Gretchen Morgenson,
The Fannie and Freddie Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at BU1.
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think tanks,185 and former executives.186 Indeed, even former
FHFA director James Lockhart has recognized the lobbying
temptations faced by GSE management, given the moral hazard
in which they operate.187 Although HERA makes considerable
changes to the overall regulatory structure, nothing in the Act
controls the GSEs’ lobbying power. Accordingly, the following
changes should be made.
First, the GSEs themselves should be prohibited from
lobbying the executive or legislative branches of the Federal
government. Although it appears this change has not been
proposed directly, it is implicit in all criticism of the GSEs. This
change will have the likely effect of helping to neutralize the
moral hazard inherent in the GSE structure. By eliminating
excessive input to the executive and legislative branches of
government, the GSEs can be regulated more objectively.
Second, it is not enough to prohibit only the GSEs themselves
from lobbying Congress or the FHFA.
The shareholders
themselves should also be prohibited from lobbying. This is
especially true for large or preferred shareholders. Finally, the
GSEs should not be allowed to contribute to congressional or
presidential campaigns.
Indeed, this exact suggestion has already been tried.188 Since
the initiation of the conservatorship, FHFA has stopped GSE
lobbying activity on a temporary basis with positive results.
Consequently, FHFA has made several significant changes that
may not have been possible had the GSEs been able to lobby
strongly. For example, FHFA appointed new CEOs and boards of
directors to both GSEs, while also developing a compensation
structure designed to benefit productive employees while not
rewarding poor performance.189 FHFA has also been able to focus

185
See, e.g., Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 3–4 (describing the
uncontrollable nature of GSE lobbying activity); Arnold Kling, Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae: An Exit Strategy for the Taxpayer, CATO BRIEFING PAPERS NO. 106, 4
(2008), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/bp/bp106.pdf (describing how GSE
lobbying prevented regulators from responding to risky behavior).
186
Pinto, supra note 31, at 138, 142–43, 148.
187
See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 151–53
(statement of James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency).
188
See id. at 142.
189
See id. at 143.
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the GSEs on foreclosure prevention programs.190 FHFA has also
set new affordable housing goals.191
Sanctions for violations of the restrictions should mirror the
scheme set out in HERA for misstatements on the GSEs’ reports
to Congress.192 The Act should impose a penalty of $1,000,000 for
each intentional violation committed “knowingly or with reckless
disregard” of the law, and $500,000 for each negligent violation of
the law.
In sum, Congress should amend HERA to require FHFA to
prohibit all lobbying by the GSEs and by large shareholders. The
massive coercive power of the GSE lobbying machine is well
documented by legislators, academics, think tanks, and the
press. GSE management, operating under a complex moral
hazard, should not be tempted to repeat the mistakes of the past.
The likely effects of this change would be to allow the GSEs’
regulator to ensure that they operate responsibly. Indeed, much
has already been proven; FHFA has already demonstrated the
positive results that come from a prohibition on GSE lobbying.
B.

The GSEs’ Affordable Housing Mission Should Be Restricted

As previously noted, HERA contains very few specifics
regarding the GSEs’ affordable housing program. In reality, the
Act contains no concrete provision that prevents a repeat of the
excessive acquisition of subprime mortgages and securities that
took place between 2000 and 2007.193 Accordingly, this Section
proposes an explicit governmental guarantee on core market
securities, and limitations on the GSEs’ affordable housing goals.
1.

Explicit Government Guarantees of “Core Market” Securities

The secondary market represents three distinct income
streams. One stream represents the “core market of routine
products” associated with most borrowers.194 The second stream
190

See id.
See id. at 142; see also Bruce Arthur, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 585, 605 (2009) (noting that FHFA’s conservatorship
seems to be stabilizing the GSEs).
192
See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4514(c) (West 2009).
193
See Pinto, supra note 31, at 18 (“Fannie and Freddie will still be subject to
the same unrealistically high affordable housing goals set by HUD (temporarily
suspended) and now the responsibility of their safety and soundness regulator.”).
194
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 88 (statement of
Michael D. Berman, Vice Chairman, Mortgage Bankers Association).
191

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 759 (2010)

2010]

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES

793

represents government-backed mortgages associated with
affordable housing finance.195 Finally, the third comes from
mortgage markets “such as nonprime, jumbo, alt-A mortgages
and other single-family and multifamily products.”196
The GSEs’ charters should be amended to allow them to offer
an explicit governmental guarantee on core securities.197 For
example, securities backed by conforming prime loans could be
explicitly guaranteed. This change will likely ensure a stable
real estate finance system.198 The core market is the most
important, functioning as “a central nervous system for the
entire real estate finance system.”199 “The core market was the
last sector of the market to experience liquidity shortages in the
recent downturn. It is also likely that the [economy as a whole]
will not recover completely until this sector is [stabilized].”200
As a corollary to this change, the Secretary of the Treasury
should state “loudly and at frequent intervals” that all noncore
securities are not guaranteed by the federal government, and
investors will have to bear all of thei risk associated with the
investment.201 This will force the secondary market to accurately
price securities backed by subprime loans.202
An implicit
governmental guarantee distorts the secondary market by
shifting risk from investors to the government.203

195

See id.
Id.
197
See id.; see also Thomas E. Plank, Regulation and Reform of the Mortgage
Market and the Nature of Mortgage Loans: Lessons from Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, 60 S.C. L. REV. 779, 805 (2008); MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOC., PRINCIPLES FOR
ENSURING MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY 8 (2009), available at http://www.mbaa.org/
files/ResourceCenter/GSE/PrinciplesonEnsuringMortgageLiquidity.pdf.
198
See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 88 (statement of
Michael D. Berman, Vice Chairman, Mortgage Bankers Association).
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
See Lawrence J. White, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Housing Finance: Why
True Privatization Is Good Public Policy, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 528, Oct. 7,
2004, at 16 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa528.pdf.
202
See Financial Crisis Hearing, supra note 47, at 3 (statement of Dr. Alan
Greenspan, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve) (“It was the failure to properly
price such risky assets that precipitated the crisis.”).
203
See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOC., supra note 197.
196
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Limitations on Affordable Housing Goals

The GSEs’ affordable housing mission is poorly defined
under HERA204 and still poses a risk of abuse. Despite the risks,
it is reasonable for the government to use the GSEs to pursue
social and policy goals in exchange for its explicit guarantee.205
Indeed, the GSEs have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for
increasing the availability of mortgage credit to low-income
borrowers.206 And underwriting standards do not necessarily
have to be sacrificed to facilitate the financing of affordable
housing. But, as recent events illustrated, when achieving social
goals takes priority over the GSEs’ financial safety, the entire
real estate finance system comes under threat.
Instead of prohibiting affordable housing finance, legislation
should reach a compromise:
The government should balance and coordinate any pursuit of
social policy goals through the secondary mortgage market
operations of [the GSEs] with their implications for safety and
soundness, the efficient operation of the secondary mortgage
market and their consistency with primary mortgage market
and / or other requirements. Such policy goals should be limited
to residential housing in a way that does not contain market
distortions.207

Accordingly, the following changes should be made. First,
the GSEs should not be allowed to purchase private label
mortgage backed securities as a means of satisfying affordable
housing goals.208 This change will discourage the creation of

204
See John Eggum, Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in
Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123,
1135 (discussing how “affordable housing” is, at best, “a flexible and nebulous
concept”).
205
See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOC., supra note 197.
206
See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Hearing, supra note 34, at 180 (statement
of Dr. Susan M. Wachter, Professor of Financial Management, Real Estate, and
Finance, The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania) (noting that the
current GSE model “worked fairly well” until the creation of private-label RMBS).
207
See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOC., supra note 197.
208
See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 182 (statement
of Dr. Susan M. Wachter, Professor of Financial Management, Real Estate, and
Finance, The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania) (“The demand for
securitized mortgages fed the demand for recklessly underwritten loans.”); id. at 140
(statement of James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency)
(“There is evidence that Enterprise efforts to meet previous housing goals, especially
through the purchase of PLS, purchases of Alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgages, and
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private label RMBS backed by poorly-underwritten loans, and it
will place the content of GSE portfolios under the direct control of
FHFA. However, this is admittedly a nonessential change, as
subprime PLS are unlikely to find willing investors for some
time.209
Second, affordable housing goals must not take priority over
the GSEs financial safety. Rather, “affordable housing goals
should . . . promote sustainable mortgage options for low- and
moderate-income families and neighborhoods.”210
Congress
should limit the amount of affordable loans that the GSEs should
be allowed to purchase. For example, a cap of no more than
twenty-five percent of the loans purchased in a year could be
“affordable.” This change will have likely prevent the GSEs from
enabling another subprime crisis. However, the change may
likely decrease the availability of affordable loans available to
consumers. However, Congress has other options for supporting
affordable housing and need not rely so heavily on the GSEs for
affordable housing finance. This may be for the best, as some
commentators have even argued that GSE affordable housing
projects represent “a new and extra constitutional way for
Congress to dispense funds.”211
HERA contains adequate enforcement mechanisms to ensure
that the GSEs comply with whatever affordable housing goals
FHFA establishes. No additional enforcement mechanisms or
sanctions are necessary.
In sum, these proposed changes reflect the need for a more
moderate approach to GSE sponsored affordable housing finance.
The GSEs are inherently conflicted and will always be under
pressure to engage in risky behavior in the name of increased
shareholder returns.212 Voluntary efforts are not enough to

overall loosening of underwriting guidelines, contributed to the unsustainable
buildup of credit risk that led to the conservatorships.”).
209
Financial Crisis Hearing, supra note 47, at 4 (statement of Dr. Alan
Greenspan, former Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System)
(“Structured investment vehicles, Alt-A mortgages, and a myriad of other exotic
financial instruments are not now, and are unlikely to ever find willing investors.”).
210
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 140 (statement of
James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency).
211
See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 55, at 3–4.
212
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Hearing, supra note 34, at 18–19 (statement of
James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency) (“[I]t is often
difficult in a political environment to . . . resist pressure to broaden the mission.”)
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discourage risky behavior.213 The longstanding federal goal of
increasing home ownership is not always realistic. “[N]o matter
how high ownership rates [climb], there [will] always [be] a group
below the norm that need[s] help.”214 The federal government
can only do so much to enable homeownership before it begins
wreaking havoc in the real estate finance system.

213
Financial Crisis Hearing, supra note 47, at 2 (statement of Dr. Alan
Greenspan, former Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
(“[T]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect
shareholder’s equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.”).
214
Steven Malanga, Obsessive Housing Disorder, 19 CITY J. NO. 2, at 14, 23
(2009), available at http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_2_homeownership.html.

